Hanoi III: Week V by Desaix Anderson

Hanoi III: Week V by Desaix Anderson
The Seminar moved beyond the historical details of America’s war with Vietnam to broad discussions of the geostrategic dimensions of the war, the Soviet Union’s role in the war, and analysis from several points of view of “Why Who Won and Why Who Lost the War.” We examined Vietnam’s integration into the political, economic, and security institutions of the region, and the road to normalization of relations between Vietnam and the United States. We also looked at the contemporary literature which engaged as Vietnam began to reform its economic system through the “Doi Moi” or renovation policies which began in 1986 when Secretary General Le Duan died and reformist, Nguyen van Linh took over leadership of the party and nation.
We examined whether fundamental decisions taking by the United States led to war rather than resolution of the issues concerning Indochina. US cooperation with Ho Chi Minh from 1943 to 1945 through the OSS (later the CIA) and US military “Deer Team” might have led to acceptance of Ho Chi Minh as a legitimate nationalist leader. But we chose, instead, to support restoration of French rule in Indochina which led to two wars. Could the US have built on that cooperation to insist that France negotiate independence for Vietnam after World War II and, thereby, avoided both the French and American Wars. Similarly, France accepted its defeat after Dienbienphu and accepted the Geneva Accords, but the United States refused to accept the Geneva Accords as a definitive end of war with Vietnam. Caught up in fears of the Soviet Union, Mao Tse-dong’s victory in China, Senator Joe McCarthy’s campaign against the “Red Scare” pushed the United States into a rabid fear of communism and irrational analysis of events in Indochina. The Cold War dictated policies rather than a careful reading of Ho Chi Minh’s intentions and policies that might have averted the tragedies for both America and Vietnam of war.
We also looked at strategic errors President Johnson may have made, stemming from faulty analysis of Ho Chi Minh’s intentions rather than viewing the issues as a function of the Cold War, which led to escalation rather than resolution of the conflict. The discussion of why who won and why who lost the war similarly examined the problems of a s succession of South Vietnamese governments, Johnson’s and Westmoreland’s militarization and Americanization of the war and the attendant emasculization of the government and army of the south in the face of the iron determination of Hanoi to pursue the nationalist goals of the independence and reunification of Vietnam.
After successfully mastering the mid-term exam in which it was clear all the students understand what we have been talking about, the students also focused on their seminar papers and spent time seeking a manageable topic and the possible Vietnamese sources of insights and commentaries. The subject matter ranges from Vietnam’s response to the global financial crisis, to evolution of art in the wake of Vietnam’s economic transition, to the role of street vendors in the economic life of Hanoi.
At week’s end, most of the students took advantage of a free week-end to take the train to Sapa, the mythic resort high in the mountains of northern Vietnam, where mists mingle with clouds in one of the most beautiful places on Earth.